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Abstract 
 The federal government has long utilized the practice of attaching conditions to the 
receipt of its funds. In the few instances that the Supreme Court had reviewed state challenges to 
conditions, it had ultimately set only minimal limitations on Congress’ spending power. That is 
why, when the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in National Federation of Independent Business 
v. Sebelius was delivered, a host of scholarly predictions emerged. Some thought the ruling 
would prompt an unraveling of other conditional spending programs. Others anticipated more 
indirect, structural changes to flow from the decision. I find that elements of both have occurred. 
 Over the past seven years, federal and state actions have revealed an interesting mix of 
results. A surge of recent legal challenges have relied on NFIB’s coercion doctrine, but the courts 
have consistently rejected those challenges. Congress has also been careful when designing new 
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Introduction 
In June of 2012, the United States Supreme Court handed down a remarkable decision in 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. Known primarily for its political 
significance, the ruling dealt with two broad components of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA): the individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion. While 
the first issue received the most public attention, many scholars have argued that the second will 
ultimately prove to be more impactful.  
As is often true when change occurs, many concerns were voiced in the wake of the 
decision. Scholars were soon hard at work with pen and paper, predicting the likely implications 
of the outcome, especially relating to the Court’s handling of the Medicaid expansion. How 
would the ruling impact the future of Obamacare? Had the Court set an important precedent 
against the federal government’s attachment of conditions to funds? How would states and 
administrative agencies respond to the decision? All were questions asked and answered by 
scholars through countless publications. 
 Now, after nearly seven years, we stand in a convenient vantage point to evaluate the 
veracity of those claims. From the Court’s handling of the Medicaid expansion, scholars 
generally expected two effects: legal challenges and restructuring. Some scholars expected only 
one of these, while others foresaw elements of both. Those expecting primarily legal challenges 
anticipated a surge of litigation against conditional funding programs, and a consequent 
reduction of congressional spending power. Those expecting primarily restructuring, in contrast, 
anticipated shifts in the architecture of federal-state partnerships. 
The object of this paper is to identify the effects of the Supreme Court’s ruling in NFIB v. 
Sebelius, as it related to the conditioning of federal funds. My research has resulted in three 
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primary findings. First, NFIB has not caused Congress to reduce funding for conditional 
programs. Second, the ruling has led states to challenge other conditional funding programs. And 
third, it has caused Congress to more carefully design new and existing conditional funding 
programs.  
To arrive at these findings, this paper proceeds in three steps. First, I set the contextual 
stage for my research. Second, I describe each scholarly prediction. Third and finally, I evaluate 
those predictions in light of recent data. 
 
Literature Review 
Setting the Stage 
The power of the purse has long been a subject of intense debate. As James Madison 
famously noted in Federalist 58, “This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most 
complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate 
representatives of the people” (Hamilton, Jay, Madison, Carey  & McClellan, 2001, p. 303). Few 
doubt the importance of the power, but there are fundamental disagreements as to its originally 
intended use. 
Even as Article I, Section 8, Clause I of the Constitution was being penned, Alexander 
Hamilton and James Madison saw its meaning differently. According to Hamilton, the Clause 
permitted Congress to promote the general welfare even where there was no separate 
enumeration of authority (Haney, 2013). According to Madison, the spending power was only to 
be used in tandem with other, constitutionally enumerated powers (Haney, 2013). 
Both views have significant implications to the practice of attaching conditions to the 
receipt of federal funds. If Hamilton’s view is adopted, the federal government has broad power 
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to leverage states with money in pursuit of policy goals. If Madison’s view is adopted, the 
federal government may only do so within its otherwise enumerated powers.  
In the 1935 case United States v. Butler, the Supreme Court sided with Hamilton, 
adopting “an expansive view of the spending power” (Haney, 2013, p. 580). The federal 
government could now pursue the general welfare by attaching conditions to the receipt of its 
funds. Naturally, Congress began to increasingly exercise this prerogative. Jurisprudence on the 
subject, however, was largely latent until the 1980s when the Court considered the case of South 
Dakota v. Dole (Haney, 2013).   
 
South Dakota v. Dole (1987) 
South Dakota v. Dole, decided in 1987, was the 20th century’s most comprehensive and relevant 
Supreme Court case pertaining to the practice of conditioning funds (Pasachoff, 2013; Haney, 
2013; Dole, 1987). There, South Dakota was challenging a federal spending program that 
conditioned receipt of highway funds on adoption of a 21-year-old minimum drinking age. The 
United States claimed that it could do so because of its power to pursue the general welfare 
through spending. South Dakota responded that the conditions amounted to a violation of 
federalism. Ultimately, the Court rejected South Dakota’s challenge and sustained the spending 
program. 
Dole’s primary significance, Eloise Pasachoff explained (2013), was the Court’s creation 
of a four-pronged test for evaluating the constitutionality of conditional spending programs. The 
standards would theoretically guide the adjudication of similar issues in the future. Instead of 
doing so, however, the prongs proved largely toothless for limiting Congressional spending 
power (Bagenstos, 2008; Jayaraman & Bates, 2015).  
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In addition to the four prongs, the Dole Court made a brief reference to the notion of 
‘coercion’ (Haney, 2013; Alder & Stewart, 2017; Bagenstos, 2014; Baker, 2015). When a 
“condition left the state with ‘no practical choice’ other than to accept,” (Jayaraman & Bates, 
2015, p. 11) the Court might consider striking it as coercive. Years later, it was this afterthought 
of coercion, rather than any of the four official prongs, that would become the most important 
element of that ruling. 
According to Reeve Bull’s assessment (2006), it was only this coercion element of Dole 
that had the potential to impose real limitations on Congress. Although this fifth prong was left 
dangerously vague in Dole, Bull asserted, it “provides a check upon Spending Clause power 
sufficient to deter congressional abuse while maintaining Congress’s ability to exercise effective 
control over the use of its funds” (2006, p. 293). Just six years after Bull made these comments, 
the Supreme Court fulfilled his prophecy by limiting Congress’ spending power primarily on 
grounds that its conditions were coercive (NFIB v. Sebelius, 2012).1  
 
NFIB v. Sebelius (2012) 
In 2010, twenty-six states challenged two provisions of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA). Relevant to this paper is the provision expanding Medicaid, which 
broadened “the number and categories of individuals that participating states must cover” 
(Baker, 2013, p. 73). States failing to expand coverage to these categories would lose all of their 
federal Medicaid funding (NFIB, 2012). The Supreme Court issued a splintered conclusion on 
                                               
 
1 Between Dole and NFIB, the Court had only partially affirmed Dole’s coercion doctrine in one instance. 
There, in Virginia Department of Education v. Riley, the Court struck Congress’ condition on education funds, citing 
Dole’s clear notice prong. A plurality, however, suggested that they would also strike on grounds of coercion (Adler 
& Stewart, 2017, p. 682; Pasachoff, 2013, p. 661). 
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this issue, consisting of three opinions (Haney, 2013, p. 585). One group concluded that the 
expansion was acceptable. The other two groups concluded that the expansion was 
unconstitutional. Describing the details of each opinion is beyond the scope of this paper, but one 
important note should be made. While the seven disapproving justices were not unified in their 
consideration of Dole’s first four prongs, they were as to the fifth (NFIB, 2012). Both concurring 
opinions invalidated the expansion on grounds of coercion, thereby affirming that doctrine 
originally identified in Dole. This affirmation was the most significant element of NFIB’s ruling 
on the Medicaid expansion, and is central to the scholarly predictions reviewed in this paper.  
Prior to NFIB, challenges to federal funding conditions had only been successful when 
grounded in one of Dole’s four traditional prongs (Virginia Department of Education v. Riley, 
1994; Bagenstos, 2013). Uniquely in NFIB, the Court agreed to strike congressional action 
primarily upon the grounds that it was coercive. Ultimately, the effects of NFIB on conditional 
spending stem from this affirmation of Dole’s coercion doctrine.  
 
Legal Challenges 
Prior to NFIB, “Never before ha[d] the Court invalidated a spending condition as 
unconstitutionally coercing the states” (Bagenstos, 2013, p. 920). According to some scholars, 
the new precedent would likely lead an increasing number of states to challenge federal spending 
conditions. By giving credence to a new form of challenge (i.e. that funding conditions are 
coercive), Professor Andrew Coan suggested (2013), “NFIB is sure to generate significant 
litigation” (p. 380). 
In the words of Leonard, Huberfield and Outterson (2013), “the courthouse doors have 
now been thrown open to challengers” (p. 46). The federal government has historically relied on 
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conditions attached to funds to ensure state cooperation with a host of its programs (Adler & 
Stewart, 2017; Ryan, 2014). But, if states catch wind of NFIB’s new style of coercion challenge 
and begin confronting these programs in Court, it could mean an extensive (Jayaraman, 2015). 
 From here, we will proceed in two parts. First, several scholars who have predicted legal 
challenges will be introduced with their claims. Second, three acts deemed most vulnerable to 
challenge will be described.  
 In a 2013 article, Professor Samuel Bagenstos claimed that federal spending programs 
across the board - from education to civil rights law - were now vulnerable to coercion claims. In 
his own words, “NFIB’s Spending Clause holding is exceptionally important. [...] By holding 
that the ACA’s Medicaid expansion provisions were unconstitutionally coercive, the Court has 
opened the field for challenges to a wide range of conditional-spending laws” (Bagenstos, 2013, 
p. 920) Pointing specifically to the Clean Air Act (CAA) and No Child Left Behind (NCLB), he 
reasoned that the coming months and years would see numerous coercion-based challenges to 
federal spending programs (Bagenstos, 2013). 
 Joining Bagenstos were scholars Jonathan Adler and Nathaniel Stewart, who argued 
similarly that NFIB “opens the door to coercion arguments in other contexts [...] and occasion a 
reexamination of statutes from No Child Left Behind to the Clean Air Act” (2017, p. 721). 
Focusing on NFIB’s break from precedent, Adler and Stewart contended (2017, p. 721) that the 
ruling turned the once-abstract restrictions of Dole into a concrete platform for discontent states.  
 Joining those three scholars is another, Bradley Joondeph, who also saw (2013) NFIB as 
having “potentially jeopardize[d] a range of federal spending programs” (p. 811). As a result, he 
suggested, congressional spending powers would be limited as the Court adhered to the recently 
affirmed coercion ruling (2013).  
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Patrick Haney has also supported his colleagues’ predictions on this front. Applying the 
coercion doctrine specifically to federal education funding programs, Haney suggested (2013) 
that federal conditions in other domains would receive greater scrutiny in the wake of NFIB. 
Thus, although Haney thought a successful coercion challenge to the NCLB was unlikely in 
2013, he suggested that the upward trend of conditional funding and a reauthorization of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act could change this.  
 In a law review article published by Boston University, Georgina Suzuki joined these 
scholars, asserting that NFIB will “almost certainly lead to legal challenges of federal conditional 
spending programs” (2013, p. 2132). Focusing specifically on the Clean Air Act, however, 
Suzuki predicted (2013) that most coercion challenges will be unfruitful due to the specificity of 
the NFIB decision. Whether or not challenges are successful, however, the article agreed that 
NFIB will “embolden states to challenge conditional federal grants under the Spending Clause” 
(Suzuki, 2013, p. 2132). 
 While these several scholars vary on some specifics, they are largely unified in deeming 
at least three programs particularly vulnerable to coercion challenges after NFIB. Those three 
programs stem from the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA, 1974), the No 
Child Left Behind Act (NCLB, 2001) and the Clean Air Act (CAA, 1963). In each, the federal 
government has attached conditions to funding received by the states. Accordingly, if NFIB 
would lead to legal challenges, these acts would be the most likely targets. I will review each of 
the three here and return to analyze the predictions later in this paper. 
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 Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). 
In his dissent to NFIB, Justice Scalia noted that, “After Medicaid, the next biggest federal 
funding item is aid to support elementary and secondary education, which amounts to 12.8% of 
total federal outlays to the States.” Although it appears that he intended this number to seem 
small in comparison to parallel Medicaid funding, some scholars have pointed to the comment as 
an indication that federal education funding would be the next target of coercion challenges.  
 In 1974, Congress enacted the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) to 
“require all schools and colleges receiving federal money to enforce policies safeguarding the 
confidentiality of students’ ‘education records’” (LoMonte, 2012).  To encourage 
implementation, the Act conditioned state eligibility for federal education funds on cooperation 
with its provisions (Chicago Tribune Company v. University of Illinois Board of Trustees, 2011; 
FERPA, 1974). Congress suggested that the condition was properly within their Article 1, 
Section 8, Clause 1, power to spend in promotion of the general welfare. To enforce its 
conditions, the Act passed authority to the Secretary of Education, who was given express 
authority to “adjudicate violations of FERPA, [...] and take any other action authorized by law 
with respect to the recipient" (Chicago Tribune Company, 2011, p. 5; Larson, 2015).   
 According to scholars (Pasachoff, 2013), the “amount of federal money at stake” (p. 643) 
made FERPA a likely target of coercion challenges. Interestingly, almost concurrent with the 
11th Circuit Court’s decision in NFIB being appealed to the Supreme Court, a dispute regarding 
FERPA was being processed in the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals. Relevant to this paper were 
arguments from appellants concerning the coercive nature of FERPA’s conditions. They asserted 
that “compliance with FERPA is not a choice because of the amount of federal funding 
involved” (Pasachoff, 2013, p. 644). The argument, which sounds remarkably similar to that 
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upheld in NFIB, was made prior to the NFIB decision, but rejected by the circuit court. With that 
case in mind, scholars have suggested that NFIB’s affirmation of the coercion doctrine would 
renew similar challenges to this program.  
 
No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB). 
Receipt of federal education funds has also been conditioned on cooperation with the No 
Child Left Behind program. According to Adler and Stewart, if NFIB does lead to state 
challenges, the NCLB may be the first target (2013). Both the size and design of the program 
make it particularly vulnerable to challenge in light of NFIB.  
 With the passage of the NCLB in 2001, federal education funding was remarkably 
enhanced (Pasachoff, 2013). According to Jayaraman (2015), the program “‘significantly 
increased’ both the federal funding and the attendant conditions” (p. 37). While the increase in 
funding was welcomed by most states, many protested the new conditions that were attached.   
One 2005 report (Pound) from the National Conference of State Legislatures was 
indicative of the widespread discontent. Twenty-three states contributed to the report (Pound, 
2005), levying an intense attack on the Act as a clear “federal overreach”(p. 615).  
 With these pre-NFIB challenges in mind, scholars consider what the ruling’s new 
ammunition would mean for states who were already discontent with the NCLB. Would the 
ruling spur states to renew challenges to the program, citing NFIB’s coercion doctrine? 
According to Pasachoff (2013) and several of his colleagues, it would.  
 In 2013, Haney authored an article specifically applying NFIB’s coercion doctrine to the 
NCLB. The article considered how a state coercion challenge to the NCLB would play out in 
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court. As a part of his assessment, Haney made clear2 his view that federal education spending 
would be the next in line for coercion challenges. Emphasizing the trend of increasing federal 
education spending over recent decades, Haney made two notable conclusions (2013). First, that 
the NCLB would be a target for coercion challenges, although unsuccessful ones. And second, 
that an increase in conditioned education funds may shift the balance, allowing for successful 
challenges. Haney described several elements of the NCLB that made it particularly vulnerable 
to a coercion challenge. 
First, he pointed to the notion of “coercion by the numbers” (2013, p. 604). As of 2010, 
he commented, the NCLB comprised 1.55% of total state expenditures. This number, he noted, is 
somewhere between that considered in Dole and in NFIB, and therefore within somewhat of a 
gray area.  
Second, Haney referred to the broader factor of “state choice” (2013, p. 609). 
Considering the increasing reliance of states on federal education funds, the Court might 
consider NCLB coercive on grounds that states lack a real choice to turn funds down (Haney, 
2013).  
Third and finally, Haney considered conditioned education funds as a percentage of state 
GDP (2013, p. 607). If the percentage were to increase, he asserted, the NCLB’s susceptibility to 
a coercion challenge would increase (2013, 611). Turning to the ESEA reauthorization that was - 
at the time Haney published - pending in Congress, he projected that the reauthorization would 
likely increase the proportion of conditioned funds to state budgets. This percentage increase, he 
                                               
 
2 “Under NFIB, if any other conditional spending item crosses from encouragement into unconstitutional 
coercion, it is education spending” (Haney, 2013, p. 604). 
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argued, would surely “increas[e] [the NCLB’s] vulnerability to a coercion challenge post-NFIB” 
(2013, p. 11).3 
 By significantly bolstering federal education funds and conditions of their receipt, the 
NCLB has been seen as particularly vulnerable to coercion challenges.  
 
Clean Air Act (CAA). 
Both enactments identified thus far (FERPA and NCLB) focus on improving education, 
and correspondingly condition the receipt of education funds. Other programs, however, are not 
as uniform in their objectives and methods. The Clean Air Act (CAA), for instance, seeks to 
protect air quality, but threatens to withdraw federal highway funds from uncooperative states. 
For this reason, and considering the significant amount of funds conditioned, the CAA has also 
been deemed particularly vulnerable to coercion challenges after NFIB. 
 In the words of Adler and Stewart, the CAA is “an obvious target for [...] litigation” 
(2017, p. 675). Relying extensively on conditions to encourage state cooperation, the Act 
reportedly “represents Congress’s most aggressive effort to induce state regulation through 
conditional spending, and is therefore the most vulnerable to a spending power challenge“ (Adler 
& Stewart, 2017, p. 684). 
The CAA (1963) authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to develop 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) and require their adherence by states. The 
agency has two primary ways of ensuring compliance with these standards. First, if states fail to 
develop adequate implementation plans for meeting the standards, the EPA may develop its own 
                                               
 
3 More specifically, Haney asserted that “if the reauthorized ESEA continues the trend of increased 
conditional spending for education, the legislation will be vulnerable to coercion challenges” (2013, p. 617). 
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plan - Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) - and effectively usurp regulatory authority from the 
state in that area (CAA, 1963). Second, the agency has the prerogative to revoke federal highway 
funds to states who fail to comply (CAA, 1963; Adler & Stewart, 2017).  Both methods of 
enforcement used by the EPA have been thought by scholars to be vulnerable to challenge in the 
wake of NFIB.  
 While numerous scholars have agreed to this vulnerability, disagreements persist as to 
what the outcomes of those challenges would be. 
On one hand, Adler and Stewart assert (2017) that state challenges will likely be fruitful 
in court. They comment that NFIB has given states a “new set of arguments” (2017, p. 673) for 
challenging the CAA’s “requirement that the EPA withhold federal highway funds4 from 
noncompliant states” (2017, p. 701). In light of these new arguments, the scholars suggest, the 
Act’s conditions will likely be ruled “impermissible coercion under NFIB” (Adler & Stewart, 
2017, p. 701).  
On the other hand, when Suzuki applied NFIB to the CAA (2013) she arrived at the 
opposite conclusion. Because the CAA is distinguishable from the Medicaid expansion, Suzuki 
concluded that it would undoubtedly pass constitutional muster over a coercion challenge (2013, 
p. 2159).  
Despite foreseeing alternate conclusions, these scholars generally agree that NFIB “will 
almost certainly lead to legal challenges of federal conditional spending programs, particularly 
the Clean Air Act (CAA)” (Suzuki, 2013, p. 2131; Adler, 2012; Baake, 2012; Bagenstos, 2013). 
                                               
 
4 These conditioned highway funds account for roughly between 3% and 4% of state budgets (Adler & 
Stewart, 2017, p. 708). 
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Each conditional funding program discussed above - FERPA, the NCLB and CAA - has 
been deemed by scholars a likely target for coercion challenges. In the Analysis section of this 
paper, we will assess these predictions by considering legal challenges made to the three acts 
since NFIB was handed down.  
So far, we have considered predictions of legal challenge. Now, we move to discuss the 
second category of expected effect: legislative and administrative restructuring. 
 
Restructuring 
Since the establishment of judicial review in Marbury v. Madison (1803), Congress has 
been significantly influenced by decisions of the Court. While neither branch is technically 
superior, the Supreme Court’s authority to strike congressional enactments sometimes makes it 
appear that way. One result of this dynamic has been Congress’ responsiveness to the Court’s 
rulings. As the Congressional Research Service has noted, even Congress’ decisions relating to 
federal grants are significantly impacted by Supreme Court rulings (Dilger, 2018).  
Numerous scholars have predicted that structural changes would flow from NFIB. They 
anticipate that Congress and administrative agencies might now fear coercion-based challenges 
and begin making adjustments. As Pasachoff put it, “the largest effects [of NFIB] are not likely 
to be doctrinal but instead legislative (in the size and design of spending programs) and 
administrative (in the implementation and enforcement of these programs)” (2013, p. 651; Ryan, 
2014, p. 1057). Of the structural effects anticipated by scholars, three are most commonly cited: 
the underfunding of conditional spending programs, softened funding, and emboldening of the 
states. I review the arguments associated with each. 
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Reduced Funding for Conditional Programs. 
In Dole, the Court decided that the conditioned highway funds did not reach the level of 
coercion. In NFIB, however, the Court ruled that the amount of Medicaid funds being 
conditioned did indeed “pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion’” (Pasachoff, 
2013, p. 587). Together, these decisions send a message: the greater the amount of funds 
conditioned, the greater the program’s vulnerability to challenge. Some scholars have wondered 
(Pasachoff, 2013, p. 651; Ryan, 2014, p. 1057) if this implication might incline Congress to 
decrease the amount of conditioned funds that it provides. The result, Pasachoff argues (2013), 
may be the “underfunding of cooperative spending programs” (p. 655).  
A significant amount of federal education funds are given to states through the Title I 
Grant Program of the ESEA. These funds, historically conditioned on cooperation with the 
NCLB, have been deemed by scholars as likely targets of reduced funding after NFIB. The 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) has also received similar attention from 
scholars. The IDEA created two relevant funding programs: Part B and Part C. Each provides 
grants to states, but conditions receipt upon cooperation with some federal policies (Pasachoff, 
2013). Like the Title I grants, the IDEA may be suspect in light of NFIB. This vulnerability, 
Pasachoff claims (2013), may lead Congress to reduce the amount of funds offered through the 
three programs. Congress has historically been reluctant to fully fund the IDEA, and Pasachoff 
anticipates NFIB exacerbating this (2013, p. 655). 
Reducing the amount of federal funds offered to states is one way that Congress may 
seek to avoid coercion challenges after NFIB. 
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Softened Funding Conditions. 
Some scholars have hypothesized that Congress would be more careful when designing spending 
programs after NFIB (Pasachoff, 2013). The argument is basic: to avoid coercion challenges, 
Congress may lean toward softening funding conditions as it authorizes new programs. By doing 
so, the threat of coercion challenges may be diminished.  
One reauthorization that has received significant scholarly attention is the most recent 
ESEA reauthorization, the Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015. In 2013, Haney suggested that 
unless the new reauthorization took a softer approach to conditioning than its predecessor 
(NCLB), the program would be vulnerable to challenge. Would Congress, aware of this danger, 
design the new program more softly to avoid a challenge?  
Since Haney published, the reauthorization has been passed by Congress. In the Analysis 
section of this paper, I will consider its design in order to evaluate Haney’s prediction. 
 
Emboldening of States. 
The emboldening of states is perhaps the most widely expected effect of NFIB among 
scholars. With a greater confidence to challenge federal demands, states may be more inclined to 
counter Congress and administrative agencies. A result of this kind could prompt changes to the 
“implementation and enforcement” (Pasachoff, 2013, p. 651; Ryan, 2014, p. 1057) of conditional 
programs, causing a shift of bargaining power toward the states and away from the federal 
government.  
What would an emboldening of the states look like in practical terms? According to 
scholars, increasing demands for administrative waivers would be the most likely outplaying.  As 
Bagenstos put it, “When states seek waivers of the requirements of entrenched programs [...] 
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they can now credibly threaten to sue to challenge the constitutionality of the underlying 
spending condition if they do not get their way” (2013, p. 921).  To understand the emboldening 
prediction in more detail, it is necessary to review the role and function of administrative 
waivers. 
Waivers are an implementation mechanism authorized by Congress and exercised by 
administrative agencies. Because regulatory authority was originally vested in Congress, the 
power to grant waivers must be passed to the executive branch via statute5 (Bagenstos, 2013). 
Not every act of Congress may be waived by agencies, but only those specifically designated by 
a statute. Put simply, waivers allow states to fall short of certain statutory requirements. For 
instance, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), as amended by the NCLB of 
2001, permitted the Secretary of Education to “waive statutory or regulatory requirements of the 
ESEA” (Flexibility and Waivers, 2012). States receiving those waivers would be allowed to fall 
short of certain NCLB standards without losing federal education funds. In another example, 
several sections of the Social Security Act (SSC, 1935) specify that “the Secretary of HHS can 
waive specific provisions of major health and welfare programs” (Hinton, Musumeci, Rudowitz, 
Antonisse, & Hall, 2019). A number of states6 have been approved for such waivers, and thereby 
permitted to deviate from statutory SSC standards.  
Because they are negotiated between agencies and states, waivers are revealing of state-
federal bargaining dynamics. States apply for waivers when confident in receiving them. 
Depending on who has more leverage, states may be more confident in pursuing waivers, and 
                                               
 
5  One example may be found in 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2010) 
6 “As of September 2017, there are 33 states with 41 approved waivers and 18 states with 21 pending 
waivers” (Hinton, Musumeci, Rudowitz, Antonisse, & Hall, 2017, p. 1). 
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agencies may be less confident in denying them. According to numerous scholars, NFIB 
advantaged the states and thus empowered them to pursue waivers more commonly and 
confidently. It is for this reason that Bagenstos anticipates an “accelerate[ing] [...] trend toward 
federalism by waiver” (2013, p. 921) in the wake of NFIB.  
In a nutshell, Bagenstos, Ryan and others suggest that NFIB shifted leveraging power to 
the states by giving teeth to the coercion doctrine. States, invigorated by the affirmation, may 
now be more inclined to request waivers from statutory requirements.  
An emboldening of states to demand waivers would have significant implications. In fact, 
according to Bagenstos, “This expansion of the practice of federalism by waiver may be the most 
important legacy of NFIB’s Spending Clause holding” (2013, p. 866).  
 
Research Design 
For decades, the federal government has conditioned the receipt of its funds on 
cooperation with its policies. History reveals that conditioning funds has hardly been uncommon, 
but the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in NFIB v. Sebelius called this practice into question. In 
the ruling’s wake, scholars have made several predictions as to the ultimate impacts of the 
decision. For the sake of this discussion, I have divided those predictions into two broad 
categories: those focusing on legal challenges, and those focusing on legislative and 
administrative restructuring. 
Nearly seven years down the road, we seek to uncover which supposed effects have 
actually occurred. To do so, I have designed my research in two ways. 
First, I conducted my study according to a before-and-after approach. In the literature 
review, I have identified two broad predictions voiced by scholars, each with more specific 
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subset predictions. In the Analysis section, I revisit each prediction in light of the past seven 
years. This before-and-after approach allows us to evaluate each claim independently, and in 
light of recent data. 
Second, I pull from a variety of sources, each tailored to the nature of the prediction 
being assessed. To evaluate predictions of legal challenge, two main methods were employed. 
First, the three acts considered most widely by scholars were used as case studies. All legal 
challenges to these acts were reviewed, and those relevant to this discussion were identified and 
included in my Analysis. Second, all United States Federal Court decisions and filings, as 
archived on govinfo.gov, were searched. To begin searching, I narrowed the scope of cases to 
review by using keywords: “NFIB,” “Sebelius,” “coerce,” “coercive,” “condition,” “federal,” 
and “funds.” The results were also limited to cases decided between January 2011, and April 
2019. Next, the keyword uses in those results were reviewed, and cases relating to our discussion 
identified. Finally, having identified relevant cases, the list was further narrowed to those helpful 
to inform my findings. Through these two methods - case studies and keyword searches - my 
findings on the first prediction were procured.  
To evaluate predictions of restructuring, three different methods were taken, each relating 
to a different subset prediction.  
For assessing the first subset claim, both federal budgets and the congressional record 
were consulted. To determine if conditional federal funding has been reduced, official federal 
budgets from FY 2011 to FY 2019 were consulted, and relevant data included in my findings. To 
determine if efforts to fully fund the IDEA have diminished, I searched the congressional record, 
as archived on govinfo.gov. Several keywords were used to locate relevant information: 
“Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,” “IDEA,” “fund,” “funding,” “fully,” and “IDEA 
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Full Funding Act.” The search was also limited to those records created from January 2011 to 
April 2019. Results with these keywords were then reviewed, and relevant records identified and 
included in my findings.  
To evaluate the second subset claim, both a narrow and broad approach were taken. First, 
the ESEA’s most recent reauthorization was considered as a case study. Relevant scholarly 
publications, congressional records and United States Code were all drawn upon. Second, the 
congressional record was reviewed for instances of legislators citing NFIB in their deliberations.  
To evaluate the third subset claim, two primary methods were utilized. First, state-level 
initiatives were considered. Commentaries, legislative records and the texts of enactments were 
informative to my findings. Second, the domains of education and medicaid were taken as case 
studies for considering recent state waiver requests. Commentaries, legislative records, political 
statements, and administrative data each contributed to my findings. These sources informed 
both quantitative waiver trends and qualitative motivations. 
Designing my research in these two broad ways has enabled me to arrive at a relatively 




Evaluating this prediction is a challenging task. For every dispute in every level of court, 
numerous filings are made for different reasons and with different outcomes. Instead of relying 
on a broad review of all filings, I use a more controlled method. Having identified the three acts 
considered to be most vulnerable to coercion challenges (FERPA, NCLB, CAA), I return now to 
each, armed with seven years of data.  
CONDITIONAL SPENDING SINCE NFIB V. SEBELIUS 23 
 
To begin my Analysis, I explore whether the ruling in NFIB did indeed prompt coercion 
challenges to these enactments. Then, I will briefly consider recent legal challenges to other acts, 
separate from these three. 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) 
As anticipated by scholars, FERPA has been challenged at least once since NFIB. More 
importantly, components of the challenge were specifically grounded in NFIB’s affirmation of 
the coercion doctrine. The petition, filed by Arthur West in 2015, reflects just the kind of 
challenge expected by Pasachoff (2013). 
 West filed a complaint against Evergreen State College for redactions made to public 
records that he had requested under the Public Records Act (PRA) (West v. Tesc Board of 
Trustees, 2018). After losing in trial and appellate courts, West appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Washington. Although his claims largely focused on elements of the PRA, another central 
component of West’s petition asserted that FERPA was unconstitutionally coercive in light of 
NFIB. West contended that “the coercive requirements of FERPA [...] violate the 10th 
Amendment anti-coercion principles recognized in NFIB v. Sebelius” (Petition for Review, 
2018, p. 9). As of now, the Supreme Court has not responded to West’s request for review.  
West’s petition is revealing. He not only used a coercion argument, but further clarified 
that it was the Court’s decision in NFIB that gave teeth to his complaint. In the petitioner's own 
words, NFIB “transformed the coercion principle from a mere rhetorical device into a legitimate 
restraint on federal conditional spending”  (Petition for Review, 2018, p. 16).  
West’s petition gives validity to Pasachoff’s predictions of legal challenge. While the 
outcome of the case is yet to be determined, the challenge itself is revealing. At least in West’s 
case, it appears that NFIB has actually contributed to a challenge of FERPA. 
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No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) 
Scholars also suggested that the NCLB would be the subject of coercion challenges in 
NFIB’s wake. My findings reveal that this has not been the case. There is, however, an important 
factor that helps to explain this result. 
Beginning in 2010 and accelerating in the following years, the Department of Education 
offered states waivers from NCLB requirements (Ayers, 2011). Consequently, states have had an 
alternate outlet from requirements of the NCLB, and have not resorted to challenging the 
program in court. 
Even when states’ requests for NCLB waivers have been denied, however, they have not 
filed suit. California, for instance, requested a waiver from NCLB requirements but was denied 
by the Education Department (Pasachoff, 2014). Nonetheless, the state did not file suit. Iowa was 
similarly denied a waiver request, but chose not to file suit, “notwithstanding the potential new 
ground for a legal challenge” (Pasachoff, 2014). 
While the availability of waivers may account for the lack of legal challenges to the 
NCLB, the absence of challenge by California and Iowa complicates the issue. If NFIB equipped 
states to make legal challenges, why did California and Iowa not press the issue? That question is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Based upon available data, we conclude that NFIB has not 
prompted coercion-based challenges to the NCLB. 
 
The Clean Air Act (CAA) 
As predicted by scholars, the CAA has been a target for legal challenges in the wake of 
NFIB. It should be noted that the CAA had also been challenged extensively prior the 2012 
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(Adler & Stewart, 2017). Pre-NFIB and post-NFIB challenges, however, differed in an important 
way. The challenges prior to NFIB cited only Dole, and generally relied upon one of the four 
traditional prongs. The post-NFIB challenge, though, did not even mention Dole, but relied 
solely upon NFIB’s affirmation of the coercion doctrine (Adler and Stewart, 2017). 
After NFIB, numerous states and sub-state entities challenged provisions of the CAA, 
claiming coercion (Adler and Stewart, 2017). In one case, challenges by the Texas Pipeline 
Association, Mississippi Commission on Environmental Quality, Gas Producers Association, and 
others, were consolidated and ultimately reviewed in Mississippi Commission on Environmental 
Quality v. EPA (2015; Nolan, Lewis, Sykes, Freeman & Hickey, 2018). 
There, petitioners challenged the Act’s provision that permitted the EPA to deny federal 
project funding for states failing to meet the air quality standards (Mississippi Commission, 
2015). Each petitioner challenged the provision on slightly different grounds, but both Wise 
County, Texas and the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (Schwinn, 2015) argued 
that the provisions exceeded federal conditioning authority (Mississippi Commission, 2015). 
Particularly, the petitioners pointed to the Act’s allowance of the EPA to “prohibit the approval 
of any transportation projects or grants within the nonattainment area” (Mississippi Commission, 
2015, p. 66). The Court reviewed coercion doctrine as applied in Dole and NFIB. Focusing 
primarily on disparate percentages of funding being conditioned, the D.C. Circuit ultimately 
concluded that “the potential funding sanctions contained in section 7509(b) of the Clean Air Act 
are not nearly as coercive as those in the ACA” (Mississippi Commission, 2015, p. 70). Of 
particular note is that petitioners “relied exclusively on NFIB,” (Adler & Stewart, 2017, p. 690) 
not even mentioning Dole.   
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Were the challenges made in this case an effect of NFIB? Some scholars are convinced 
that they were. Professor Steven Schwinn, for example, commented just days after the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision, “The federalism challenge in the case, Mississippi Commission on 
Environmental Quality v. EPA, sought to exploit the plurality ruling in NFIB” (Schwinn, 2015). 
I conclude that the nature of the assertion in this case confirms Schwinn’s suspicion that NFIB 
prompted these challenges.  
 Numerous other challenges have been made to the CAA. In Oklahoma v. EPA (2013), for 
example, the State submitted a motion to stay the EPA’s standards, alleging that “Section 111(d) 
Rule Unlawfully Coerces Oklahoma” (Oklahoma v. EPA, 2013, p. 12) according to the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in NFIB. Oklahoma claimed that the policy “violates this anti-coercion doctrine by 
threatening to punish the citizens of States (as well as the States themselves) that do not carry out 
federal policy” (Oklahoma v. EPA, 2013, p. 12). Oklahoma’s direct references to NFIB for 
support indicate that the State’s challenge was, at least in some degree, precipitated by the ruling. 
In another instance, just a month after NFIB was announced, a Notice of Supplemental 
Authority was filed by Texas in a then-pending dispute with the EPA. In the suit, Texas was 
challenging a CAA requirement that states update their regulations on greenhouse gases (Ryan, 
2014), but on grounds other than coercion. When the ruling in NFIB was published, Texas 
quickly filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority, arguing that the decision’s coercion doctrine 
was relevant to the ongoing dispute. As one Chicago-Kent Law Review article put it, “After 
NFIB, Texas wasted little time submitting a notice of supplemental authority, arguing that the 
EPA’s action is coercive” (Oklahoma v. EPA, 2014). The state’s argument was grounded in 
NFIB, and clearly prompted by the ruling’s affirmation of Dole’s coercion doctrine. The Court 
ultimately rejected Texas’ argument, distinguishing the circumstances from those at issue in 
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NFIB. Although unsuccessful, Texas’ filing demonstrated a willingness by states to “make use of 
the new Sebelius doctrine” (Ryan, 2013, p. 16).  
 The Clean Power Plan (CPP), an EPA policy under the CAA, has also seen a host of 
recent challenges. When the CPP was proposed in 2015, numerous states and entities (West 
Virginia v. EPA, 2016; Goelzhauser & Rose, 2017; Martina, 2015, p. 27) sought a stay on its 
implementation, arguing that it would be unconstitutionally coercive under NFIB (Federal 
Register, 2015, p. 64881; Rivkin, Grossman, & DeLaquil, 2015). Cumulatively, “150 entities 
including 27 states, 24 trade associations, 37 rural electric co-ops, and three labor unions 
challenged the CPP highlighting a range of legal and technical concerns” (“Electric Utility 
Generating Units…”, 2017, p. 2).  
Ultimately, in February of 2016, the Supreme Court issued a stay on the CPP 
(Goelzhauser & Rose, 2017; Revesz, 2016). Then in October of 2017, the EPA proposed to 
repeal the CPP (“Electric Utility Generating Units…”, 2017).  
 The nature of these challenges to the CAA and CPP indicate a relation to the Court’s 
ruling in NFIB. Even as the CPP was being developed in 2015, the implications of NFIB were 
included in the discussion. For instance, during a meeting of the House Committee on Energy 
and Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy and Power, Professor Laurence Tribe was invited to 
testify (Tribe, 2015) to his “legal views regarding EPA’s proposed” (p. 1) CPP.  In concluding 
his statement, Tribe asserted (2015) that, “These sanctions closely resemble those found 
impermissible in NFIB v. Sebelius,” (p. 24) and are therefore likely to elicit coercion-based 
challenges.  
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Other 
So far, our review has revealed that two of the three acts (FERPA and CAA) considered 
most vulnerable by scholars have, indeed, been challenged in the wake of NFIB. While these acts 
have borne the brunt of post-NFIB challenges, there are several additional programs to mention.  
For instance, in State of Texas v. United States of America (2016), the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Texas heard a complaint from Texas, Indiana, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Nebraska, and Wisconsin. The plaintiff states’ arguments relied heavily upon NFIB’s 
affirmation of the coercion doctrine. Quoting NFIB extensively, the states challenged the 
conditions attached to healthcare funds disbursed through Medicaid and the Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (CHIP) (State of Texas, 2016, p. 3). According to the states, the conditions 
should be struck in light of NFIB, because they amounted to the coercion of a “gun to the head” 
(State of Texas, 2016, p. 27). Ultimately, the court found that because Congress technically 
established the requirements as a tax, rather than a condition, the states did not have a valid 
claim. Although ultimately unsuccessful in court, the challenge demonstrates NFIB’s coercion 
doctrine in action. 
In another case, Mayhew v. Burwell (2014), the courts considered a healthcare related 
petition filed by the State of Maine. In 2009, Maine agreed to a provision in the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA, 2009), stipulating that the state would maintain its 
“Medicaid eligibility criteria at July 1, 2008 levels until December 31, 2010” (Mayhew, 2014, p. 
7). In exchange, Congress offered additional stimulus funds to the state. In March of 2010, a 
Maintenance of Effort (MOE) provision was included in the Affordable Care Act (ACA), 
conditioning the continued receipt of those stimulus funds on the state’s sustaining of those 
eligibility requirements until October 1, 2019. 
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In August of 2012, Maine’s Department of Health and Human Services (Maine DHHS) 
increased Medicaid eligibility requirements in excess of the ACA’s allowed levels (Mayhew, 
2014). The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) subsequently disapproved 
the change, notifying Maine that the state would lose stimulus funds if the change was 
implemented. Maine DHHS challenged the DHHS’ threat, arguing that the financial conditions 
were unconstitutionally coercive according to NFIB (Mayhew, 2014; Miller, 2015). After losing 
in court on two occasions, Maine filed a Writ of Certiorari with the US Supreme Court. In 
denying that request, the Court gave significant attention to the state’s coercion claims, 
concluding ultimately that “there is no merit to petitioner’s contention (Pet. 12-22) that the MOE 
requirement at issue here is impermissibly coercive under NFIB v. Sebelius” (Mayhew, 2014; 
Miller, 2015). Despite this conclusion, the dispute demonstrates the role that NFIB has played in 
enabling coercion challenges.  
In March of 2015, Sara Rosenbaum from the Health Affairs Journal wrote an article 
highlighting another relevant case. There, in King v. Burwell (2015), the US Supreme Court 
considered plaintiffs’ coercion arguments against the conditioning of tax credits. While many 
other elements were involved, related issues arose during oral arguments, where US Attorney 
Michael Carvin discussed the implications of NFIB with Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg and Scalia. 
The Justices challenged Carvin’s claims that the program was not coercive under NFIB (Oral 
Arguments, 2015, p. 19), a conversation demonstrating NFIB’s continued relevance. Jayaraman 
has even argued that this questioning during oral argument “suggest[s] that the Supreme Court 
might adopt a broader restriction on Congress’ ability to condition funds” (Jayaraman & Bates, 
2015, p. 44). 
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In 2013, another dispute (NCAA v. New Jersey, 2013) arose where New Jersey challenged 
the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (PASPA) as coercive. The United 
States government had filed suit against New Jersey’s proposed licensing of sports gambling, 
claiming that the state law would violate PASPA. In response, New Jersey argued that “the 
choices states face under PASPA are as coercive as the Medicaid expansion provision struck 
down in Sebelius” (NCAA, 2013, p. 80). The Court ultimately disagreed and upheld federal 
PASPA requirements. 
Finally, the courts have also considered the Trump Administration’s conditions to grant-
in-aid programs. Under this Administration, the United States Attorney General’s Office and 
Department of Justice have been directed to interpret the Immigration and Nationalization Act 
(INA, 1965) as allowing for conditioning federal grants. Specifically, the Administration has 
determined that receipt of the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (Byrne JAG) 
and grants issued by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) are to be 
conditioned on the meeting of INA Section 1373 requirements (City and County of San 
Francisco v. Trump, 2018). In 2013, the State of California passed the TRUST Act, in 2016 the 
TRUTH Act, and in 2017 the Values Act (San Francisco, 2018). Each statute limited the 
prerogatives of state officers to seek the private information of crime victims and witnesses. In 
doing so, each of these state provisions limited officers’ cooperation with requirements of INA 
Section 1373. Claiming the state provisions contravened requirements of Section 1373, the 
President issued Executive Order 13768 which directed the Department of Justice to withhold 
“federal grants to so-called sanctuary jurisdictions” (San Francisco, 2018, p. 3). The City and 
County of San Francisco filed suit, challenging the executive order. 
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In City and County of San Francisco v. Trump, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
considered this dispute. Ultimately, it concluded that the executive branch could not apply 
funding conditions without authorization by Congress. While the holding speaks only indirectly 
to the effects of NFIB, California’s challenge demonstrates a state willingness to confront federal 
conditions on grounds of coercion (San Francisco, 2018). 
 Having reviewed several post-NFIB coercion challenges, we draw conclusions on the 
veracity of scholarly claims. In line with the predictions, two of the three acts considered most 
vulnerable to coercion challenge have been confronted with those challenges since 2012. 
Although the third did not sustain legal challenges, this appears to have been due to a surge in 
waiver availability. Additionally, numerous NFIB-style legal challenges have been made to other 
spending programs, including healthcare, PASPA and grants-in-aid. While some coercion 
challenges were made before 2012, the arguments of the more recent petitions reveal a heavy 
reliance upon NFIB for support. This reliance evidences the conclusion that NFIB has, at least in 
some degree, encouraged states and sub-state entities to challenge federal conditions.  
Having assessed the first scholarly prediction of legal challenges, we move now to 
consider the indirect, structural effects of the decision. 
 
Restructuring 
Claims of restructuring are somewhat more complex to evaluate. Instead of reviewing 
direct effects (i.e. legal challenges made in court), we review indirect effects (i.e. administrative 
and legislative adjustments made in anticipation of legal challenges).   
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 I will proceed by assessing each scholarly prediction in light of available data. The three 
primary predictions, as described above, are of (1) reduced funding for conditional programs, (2) 
softened funding conditions, (3) and emboldening of the states.  
 
Reduced Funding for Conditional Programs 
To begin, our scope must be narrowed. While many conditional spending programs exist, 
most of them are not large enough to elicit coercion challenges. Thus, an assessment of those 
budgets would not be helpful. Instead, I take as a case study the program scholars have deemed 
most likely to have been adjusted by Congress: federal education funding. Contrary to scholarly 
predictions, the conditional education program has not seen reduced discretionary funding in the 
wake of NFIB.  
The ESEA was passed in 1965, increasing federal financial involvement in education. Of 
its many parts, Pasachoff suggests that the Title I Grant Program, “which focuses on the 
education of poor children,” is the “centerpiece of the Act” (Pasachoff, 2013, p. 614). Title I is 
also the primary funnel for federal education aid to state governments. Consequently, when 
conditions are attached to education aid, it is usually funds granted through the Title I Program 
that are at stake.  
Contrary to scholarly predictions, however, there has not been an overall decrease to 
discretionary Title I funding in the wake of NFIB. In 2012, the total discretionary funding for the 
Department of Education was $68,112,288, and the portion given as ESEA Title 1 Grants was 
$14,516,457. In 2018, the numbers were $70,867,406, and $15,759,802. According to the 
government’s most recent budget for FY 2020, these numbers are set to continue increasing this 
year (“A Budget for a Better...”, 2019). (Department of Education, 2018) 
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If Congress were to have begun decreasing funding to conditional spending programs, 
Title I Grants would have been the place to start. The fact that this aid has not been reduced is 
indicative of a broader conclusion: scholarly predictions were incorrect.  
Scholars also predicted a congressional adjustments to the IDEA funding program. 
According to Pasachoff (2013), “the bi-partisan movement to fully fund special education 
programs” (p. 655) would be diminished as a result of NFIB. Recent data reveals otherwise. 
Federal aid to states through the IDEA has not decreased since NFIB. In 2012, the amount 
granted to states under the IDEA Part B and C7 was $454,650,501 (“Broken Promises...”, 2018, 
pp. 22-23). In 2018, the number was $470,971,086 (“Broken Promises…”, 2018, p. 
22).  Furthermore, there is no evidence of Congress stepping away from efforts to fully fund the 
IDEA. In fact, two bipartisan bills have recently been introduced, one to the House in 2017 
(H.R.2902 - IDEA Full Funding Act) and another to the Senate in 2018 (S.2542 - IDEA Full 
Funding Act), that would provide “a glidepath to fully funding IDEA” (“IDEA Full Funding...”, 
2018). Although neither has yet been adopted by Congress, bipartisan support has been sustained 
since NFIB.  
The case study of ESEA Title I grants reveals no decrease of conditional spending since 
2012. Neither do recent developments of the IDEA reveal post-NFIB adjustment. Accordingly, 
we conclude that as of April 2019, Congress has not reduced conditional spending in response to 
NFIB. 
 
                                               
 
7 “IDEA Part B distributes funds to states under two sections: Section 611 provides funds for children ages 
three to 21 receiving special education in public schools and Section 619 provides preschool grants for children ages 
three to five”(p. 20) “IDEA Part C provides grants to states to assist in providing services to children with 
disabilities, from birth to age two, and their families” (p. 23; “Broken Promises…”, 2018, p. 20). 
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Softened Funding Conditions 
Some scholars have hypothesized that Congress would begin designing funding 
conditions more carefully after NFIB. Considering the new threat of coercion challenges, they 
predicted, Congress would be less inclined to attach harsh requirements to its aid. To evaluate 
this prediction, I first take a case study approach and consider the most recent reauthorization of 
the ESEA. Then, I review several other instances of softening beyond the ESEA. 
 In 2015, Congress passed and the President signed the Every Student Succeeds Act 
(ESSA, 2015), a reauthorization of the ESEA to replace No Child Left Behind (NCLB, 2001). 
The NCLB had been embroiled in conflict since its authorization, but especially in the wake of 
NFIB. States were generally discontent with the statute and its conditions on federal education 
funding. If states did not cooperate with NCLB requirements, they were at risk of losing 
education funds received through the ESEA Title I program. 
Discussions in both houses of Congress during the ESSA’s consideration revealed an 
awareness that, as Kimberly Robinson put it, the authorization “must be adopted consistent with 
the Supreme Court's analysis in NFIB” (Robinson, 2016, p. 225). Legislators considering the 
ESSA were intent on designing the reauthorization to be less coercive than its predecessor, the 
NCLB. Numerous evidences support this conclusion.  
 First, the final design of the reauthorization is significantly less vulnerable to coercion 
claims than the NCLB had been. As Paul Hoversten has noted, the “ESSA is not more lucrative 
than its predecessor No Child Left Behind, and its conditions are less onerous” (Hoversten, 
2017). Congress designed the ESSA to be much softer toward states than the NCLB had been. 
 Second, this softened design was specifically intended by legislators to create a less 
coercive program. Several congressional reports evidence this conclusion. For instance, in a 
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report filed by the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee, it was noted that, 
“The committee bill [ESSA] expands prohibitions on the Federal Government and use of Federal 
funds. [...] This language will help address long-standing concerns that the Federal Government 
became too involved pushing States to adopt the Common Core” (Committee Report, 2016, p. 
54). In a conference report (2015) to the House, similar comments were made. There, 
Representative Roe from Tennessee spoke in support of the ESSA, noting that the 
reauthorization would eliminate the Department of Education’s authority to condition funds on 
adoption of Common Core, and thereby reduce the program’s coerciveness (Conference Report, 
2015). Roe’s comment exemplifies the sort of efforts to soften conditions that scholars expected. 
 Other statements from members of Congress have also been revealing. As Representative 
Barletta mentioned to the House, the ESSA “includes unprecedented restrictions on the Secretary 
of Education's authority, and prevents the federal government from requiring or coercing states 
to adopt the Common Core curriculum” (Conference Report, 2015).  
While the ESSA’s adoption does appear to support scholars’ predictions, it should be 
noted that federal involvement in education tends to go through “cycles of great expansion and 
contraction” (Robinson, 2016). The ESSA’s favor toward states, then, should not be seen solely 
as a result of NFIB, or any other single factor.  
 It is clear, however, that Congress was particularly interested in reducing the 
coerciveness in education through its new reauthorization. The legislative records reveal a clear 
congressional care to design the program carefully, and in light of NFIB’s implications. Beyond 
the case study of the ESSA, there are also several noteworthy anecdotes. 
 First, when the House Committee on Veterans Affairs was considering the GI Bill 
Tuition Fairness Act of 2013, they expressed concern that the program might cross the coercion 
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line drawn in NFIB. Before voting to advance the Bill, the Committee requested legal advice 
from the Congressional Research Service on the question of coercion (Committee Report, 2013). 
This congressional care for the implications of NFIB is precisely the kind predicted by scholars.  
Second, in a meeting of the Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, the 
Strengthening America’s Schools Act of 2013 (SACA) was being considered. Senators 
Alexander, Enzi, Burr, Isakson, Paul, Hatch, Roberts, Murkowski, Kirk, and Scott issued a joint 
statement (Committee Report, 2013) in opposition to the Act. Among the criticisms voiced in the 
statement were fears that the Act would be coercive in light of NFIB. Using the Court’s 
language, the Senators noted that the Act functioned as a ‘‘gun to the head’’ that crossed the line 
between encouragement and coercion (Committee Report, 2013, pp. 96-98). The Senators’ 
concerns exemplify the effects that scholars expected. 
 Third, the Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2017 (PPRP) (H. R. 1689) was 
introduced and referred to the Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice of the 
Committee on the Judiciary. The Bill eventually moved from the Committee and was passed by 
the House, but rejected by the Senate. Several critiques were offered in committee, but 
opponents specifically voiced concern that the Act’s funding conditions were unconstitutional 
under NFIB. One point of dissent offered in the committee report specifically pointed to NFIB 
and suggested that the PPRP’s conditions may be struck under the 2012 ruling (Committee 
Report, 2018, p. 20). Opposing committee members suggested that, “as the Court noted in 
Sibelius, conditional federal spending can constitute unconstitutional coercion if it threatens 
states with too great of a loss. Here, H.R. 1689’s threatened loss of all federal economic 
development funds may be so draconian as to be unconstitutionally coercive” (Committee 
Report, 2018, p. 20).   
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NFIB was also on the minds of the PPRP’s proponents. So much so, in fact, that they 
included a preemptive defense to coercion arguments, explicitly referencing NFIB (Committee 
Report, 2018, p. 2). William Buzbee, Professor of law at Georgetown University Law Center, 
was asked to testify to the Committee concerning the legal components of the Act. In line with 
opponents’ concerns, he cautioning that “the 2012 NFIB v. Sebelius decision did say that 
conditional Federal spending can be unconstitutionally coercive, and so I think important for this 
committee and Congress to assess the magnitude of this bill’s financial threat to State and local 
governments if Federal economic development funds were forfeited” (Committee Report, 2018, 
p. 11). The Committee’s deliberations of the PPRP suggest that legislators are, indeed, carefully 
designing funding conditions in light of NFIB. 
 Fourth and finally, when the EPA was considering implementation of the Clean Power 
Plan (CPP) in 2015, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy 
and Power invited Laurence Tribe to testify concerning his “legal views” (p. 1) of the CPP.  In an 
almost prophetic statement, Tribe testified that “These sanctions closely resemble those found 
impermissible in NFIB v. Sebelius,” and may be targets of coercion challenge (2015, p. 24).  
 Both the ESSA case study and the four additional examples are revealing. In each 
case, a congressional care for designing funding conditions is made clear. Based on these cases, 
we conclude that scholars correctly predicted that Congress would design new funding 
conditions carefully in light of NFIB. 
 
Emboldening of States 
Scholars have also suggested that NFIB would embolden states in their dealings with 
administrative agencies. As Ryan put it, “the better a state’s chances in court [...] the stronger the 
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state’s bargaining position becomes at the table” (Ryan, 2013, p. 19). In light of both state-level 
initiatives and waiver trends, I find that no large scale emboldening has occurred. There have 
been, however, some small scale efforts to combat federal funding conditions. Two recent state-
level initiatives in Texas and West Virginia are examples. 
 In February of 2013, House Bill 1379 was proposed to the Texas legislature, which 
would require: 
the attorney general and the Legislative Budget Board to prepare a report to the 
legislature [...] each even-numbered year that identifies all the coercive federal funding 
programs8 that deliver more than $100 million yearly to the state; the governor to work 
with governors of other states to develop a coordinated approach with respect to all 
coercive federal funding programs; and agencies and officers of the state to implement, 
during the pendency of an action brought by the attorney general related to coercive 
federal funding programs, all coercive federal funding programs without regard to any 
conditions designated as coercive by the bill.  
Furthermore, as Budget Director Ursul Parks described, the Act would authorize “the 
attorney general to bring an action to enjoin the enforcement of a coercive condition [...] and to 
sue for appropriate relief if certain actions are taken by the federal government” (Parks, 2013). In 
May of 2013, the Bill was approved in a 3-2 vote by the House Committee on Federalism and 
Fiscal Responsibility. Since then, however, it has not been considered by the whole legislative 
body (Texas Legislature Online, 2019).  
                                               
 
8 In a 2013 article, the Texas Public Policy Foundation identified several programs that would likely fit this 
ticket. Included were both ESEA Title 1 Grants and CAA financial sanctions. 
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In October of 2013, the Texas Public Policy Foundation endorsed the Bill in an article 
(Loyola, 2013) entitled, “Loosening the Federal Straightjacket: How the NFIB Decision Affects 
Federal Funds in State Budgets.” The Foundation’s advocacy provides a helpful insight into 
public support for the Bill.  
The Foundation (Loyola, 2013), with other proponents, have focused significant attention 
on NFIB. They argued that NFIB opened the door for Texas to be liberated from federal 
coercion, and that it was now the state’s duty to fight the federal programs in court (Loyola, 
2013). From this belief flowed proponents’ broad conclusion: “it is up to the states to test the 
boundaries of that new flexibility—and to push back everywhere that federal coercion comes 
attached to a dollar of federal ‘assistance’” (Loyola, 2013, p. 10).  
The emboldened spirit seen in proponents of Texas’ Bill has also been exemplified in 
some West Virginians. Largely parallel to Texas’ Bill, House Bill 2556 was introduced to the 
West Virginia Legislature in 2017, and referred to the House Judiciary Committee where it is 
currently pending (West Virginia Legislature, 2019). The Bill (House Bill 2556, 2017), if 
enacted, would require one of the state’s financial committees to draft a ‘Coercive Federal Funds 
Report’ to accompany every state budget. In light of the report’s findings each year, the state 
Attorney General would be authorized to challenge federal conditions that the state deemed to be 
coercive (House Bill 2556, 2017).  
 Both proposed bills, House Bill 1379 and House Bill 2556, reflect some emboldening of 
state representatives to challenge federal conditions. Neither has yet been adopted as law, 
however, which evidences a lack of broad public support for the measures. In sum, the proposed 
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bills do reveal some degree of the emboldening anticipated by scholars. Ultimately, however, 
their minimal success points to the emboldening’s lack of breadth. 
 In addition to considering these state-level initiatives, we turn also to recent 
administrative waiver trends. As noted earlier in this paper, waivers were expected by scholars to 
be a primary vehicle for state emboldening. We now consider what recent data reveals of those 
expectations.  
Administrative waivers have been used increasingly since 2012. What is uncertain, 
however, is why that has been the case. One explanation, supported by Bagenstos and Ryan, is 
that NFIB has emboldened states to demand waivers. If this prediction were valid, we would 
expect to find a trend of states confidently pursuing waivers. To assess, we again take a case 
study approach, reviewing the two domains that scholars considered most likely to be affected. 
 
Education 
If states were to demand waivers from a federal requirement, the NCLB would have been 
a likely target. By significantly increasing federal grants and conditions on their receipt 
(Bagenstos, 2013), the NCLB caused ripples since its passage in 2001. It established that to 
receive certain federal education funds, states were required to jump through federal hoops 
(Bagenstos, 2013). 
In 2011, Secretary Arne Duncan of the Department of Education announced that he 
would begin accepting state applications for waivers from several NCLB requirements (Duncan, 
2011; “Obama Administration Sets…”, 2011). The move was widely seen as a means of 
sidestepping Congress, who had been delaying passage of President Obama’s ESEA 
reauthorization proposal (Black, 2015). Under the new program, states with approved waivers 
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could continue to receive federal education funding even without meeting the NCLB’s statutory 
requirements.  
To receive waivers, however, states were required to adopt a new set of federal standards 
(“Obama Administration Sets…”, 2011). Functionally, waivers from the NCLB’s conditional 
funding programs were themselves conditioned upon agreement to another set of requirements 
(Nathaniel, Metzger & Morrison, 2013). Among the requirements were some eighteen policy 
commitments (McGuinn, 2016). Despite the program’s requirements, “forty-five states had 
submitted requests for a waiver” (Black, 2015) by 2012.  
Three relevant points should be made concerning the nature of the waivers. Each point 
indicates that, while more waivers were granted after NFIB, this does not mean that those 
waivers were a result of the ruling.  
First, they were initiated by the federal government. Second, the conditions indicate a 
federal, not state, emboldening. Third, the states had ulterior motives for seeking waivers.  
Several facts support the first point. Most convincing is that the waivers were first 
advertised by the federal agency. They were not conceded upon pressure or leveraging by states, 
but offered on federal initiative. Additionally, the purpose of the new waivers was not to appease 
states who threatened coercion-based challenges, but to leverage states for the Administration’s 
policy objectives. The waiver conditions essentially replicated the Obama Administration’s 
ESEA reauthorization that Congress had rejected. As the President himself confirmed, this was 
no coincidence. Announcing the new waiver program, President Obama commented, “I’ve urged 
Congress for a while now, let’s get a bipartisan effort to fix this [NCLB]. Congress hasn’t been 
able to do it. So I will...Given that Congress cannot act, I am acting” (McGuinn, 2016, p. 8). The 
waiver program was an initiative of the Administration, not a response to emboldened states. 
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To the second point, several facts are supportive. While many states9 applied for waivers, 
some did not. California, for instance, opted not to apply (“ESEA Flexibility”, 2016) and their 
reasons for doing so are informative. According to State Official Tom Torlakson, the Department 
of Education was simply “switching out one set of onerous standards, No Child Left Behind, for 
another set of burdensome standards” (Hart, 2012). The waivers envisioned by Bagenstos and 
Ryan would be timid efforts to appease emboldened states. The waivers offered here, though, 
were clearly much more aggressive. Montana also refused to apply for a waiver, and for parallel 
reasons. State Official Denise Juneau echoed Torlakson’s sentiments that the waivers being 
offered were even more burdensome than the NCLB had been. 
According to Senator Lamar Alexander, Chairman of the Senate Health, Education, 
Labor, and Pensions Committee, the waivers offered by the Secretary were not federal 
concessions, but rather an effort by the agency to leverage states toward the Administration’s 
policies (Black, 2015; Wong, 2015).  
To the third point, there is also supportive evidence. State motives for pursuing the 
waivers have been widely attributed to intense dissatisfaction with the NCLB (McGuinn, 2016). 
Thus, even though receipt of a waiver was conditioned upon agreement to the Secretary’s new 
set of policies, most states saw the opportunity as worthwhile. This ulterior motive helps to 
explain why states sought waivers, even when it meant committing to a new set of conditions.  
                                               
 
9 “45 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Bureau of Indian Education submitted requests 
for ESEA flexibility and 43 States, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico are approved for ESEA flexibility” 
(“ESEA Flexibility”, 2016). 
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These three points demonstrate that increasing waiver requests in the field of education 
do not necessarily evidence an emboldening of states, as predicted by scholars. In the domain of 
Medicaid, a similar result is apparent. 
 
Medicaid 
A number of states have recently pursued waivers from Medicaid requirements. This is, 
however, primarily a result of the Trump Administration’s recent changes, rather than from 
emboldening effects of NFIB. In December of 2018, the Trump Administration “issued [a] new 
waiver guidance” policy (Rudowitz, 2018). The new policy represents a significant departure 
from the former Administration’s approach, where the federal government had imposed 
significant demands on states. The Obama Administration had “substantially [...] limited the 
types of state waiver proposals that the federal government would approve,” accepting only 
reinsurance waivers (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Service, 2018). Now, the Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) have opened the door to accepting waiver applications 
from a much broader range of requirements, in an effort to give states “more flexibility to design 
alternatives to the ACA” (“Trump Administration announces…”, 2018). Naturally, this 
broadened scope has prompted a surge of state waivers requests. 
The question we must ask is whether the noted pursuit of NCLB and Medicaid waivers 
was truly a result of NFIB’s coercion ruling. Did NFIB cause an emboldening for this pursuit, or 
would it have occurred regardless of the Court’s conclusion? Ultimately, in light of ulterior 
political motives and federal initiative, we conclude that recent surges in NCLB and Medicaid 
waivers do not affirm scholarly predictions. No evidence has been uncovered that reveals an 
emboldening of states to pursue these waivers. 
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Conclusion 
Just as Madison and Hamilton saw the Spending Clause differently, contemporary 
scholars anticipated a wide range of effects to flow from NFIB. Some focused on legal 
challenges, and others on legislative and administrative restructuring. All, however, recognized 
that the ruling was significant, and would have some recognizable effects. 
Through case studies and broad reviews, I have evaluated numerous scholarly predictions 
in light of the past seven years of data. In conclusion, I summarize my findings in four points. 
First, NFIB has prompted a series of coercion-based legal challenges. Disputes involving 
both FERPA and the CAA reveal a significant use of NFIB by entities to challenge federal 
funding conditions. Furthermore, other legal challenges to healthcare, PASPA and grant-in-aid 
programs support this finding. By affirming Dole’s coercion prong, NFIB gave teeth to 
complaints against federal conditions. 
Second, there is no evidence that Congress has reduced amounts of conditional funding in 
the wake of NFIB. Looking to the ESEA Title I Grant Program and IDEA Parts B and C as case 
studies, I find that neither has sustained funding reductions since 2012. Furthermore, bipartisan 
support for fully funding the IDEA does not appear to have been affected by NFIB. 
Third, there is evidence that NFIB has affected how Congress designs new conditional 
funding programs. Using the ESSA as a case study, I find that Congress has intentionally 
designed new programs with softened conditions. Further examples of other congressional acts10 
are also supportive of this conclusion.  
                                               
 
10 The GI Bill Tuition Fairness Act of 2013, Strengthening America’s Schools Act of 2013, Private 
Property Rights Protection Act of 2017, and the Clean Power Plan of 2015. 
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Fourth and finally, I find lacking evidence of state emboldening. Legislative initiatives in 
Texas and West Virginia do indicate some level of boldness stemming from NFIB, but neither 
measure has been enacted or put to a vote. Waiver requests also provide no evidence of 
emboldening. In both case studies - education and Medicaid - increasing waiver applications 
were a result of federal, not state, action. Accordingly, these increases reflect administrative 
policy efforts, not state emboldening. Furthermore, neither state whose waiver was denied has 
filed suit, or threatened to do so. In light of these facts, I conclude that NFIB has not emboldened 
states to demand administrative waivers.  
From Butler, to Dole, to NFIB, federal conditioning authority has undergone continual 
evolution. For now, the Court has applied brakes to the practice of attaching conditions, but there 
is no guarantee that this will be sustained. In 2012, NFIB gave teeth to coercion challenges. What 
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